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RECENT CASE NOTES
ALIENS-OPINIONS AND BELIEFS AS AFFECTING TRUE FAITH AND
ALLEGIANCE--Respondent was born in Hungary; came to the United States
to visit and lecture. She is a woman of education and accomplishments.
On application for citizenship she stated she fully believed in our form of
government, had read, and was willing to take the oath of allegiance.
Question 22 of the application was: "If necessary, are you willing to
take up arms in defense of this country?" She answered: "I would not
take up arms personally." . . . "I cannot see that a woman's refusal
to take up arms is a contradiction to the oath of allegiance." For the
fulfillment of the duty to support and defend the Constitution and laws
she had in mind other means. . . . "I disapprove of the government
asking me to fight personally with my fists or carrying a gun." "I
consider it a question of conscience."
The Naturalization Act of 1906 requires: The applicant for naturaliza-
tion "shall . . . declare on oath . . . that he will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies
foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same."
"It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that
the application . . . (is) . . . attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the same." (8 U. S. C. A. No. 381, and No. 382.)
The question was whether this applicant, a woman 49 years old, was
entitled to citizenship. Held: Application denied. Supreme Court of the
United States, May 27, 1929, 279 U. S. 644; 49 S. Ct. 448 (Holmes,
Brandeis, and Sanford, JJ., dissenting; reversing decision by Judge Ander-
son, 27 F. (2d) 742).
The cases are few, and not exactly in point. None was cited by the
court on the crucial point. Two cases held that a male conscientious
objector could, in the discretion of the court, be refused citizenship. In re
Roeper, (1921) 274 F. 490 (U. S. D. C., Del.), and State ex rel. Weisz v.
District Court, (1921) (Mont.) 202 Pac. 387. Tutan vz. U. S., (U. S. C.
C. A. Mass.) (1926) 12 F. (2d) 763, held that the requirements of the
naturalization law must be construed liberally in favor of the petitioner.
The argument of the court seems to be two-fold. First: It is a prin-
ciple of the Constitution that citizens must fight to defend the country by
arms, when necessary. To this principle the applicant is not attached.
Therefore she is not attached to the principles of the Constitution, within
the statutory requirdment. If the court intends to assign the refusal of
the applicant to bear arms herself as a reason for her exclusion, it should
be noted that here is an altogether new doctrine in the annals Of civilized
government: and obvious implication that women are expected as a matter
of positive duty to fight "with their fists and carry a gun." Such doctrine
is not inferable from the Draft cases. For in those cases the court had
before it a law drafting only men.
Hence, it would seem that if the court is making the unwillingness of
the applicant personally to take up arms a bar to her entrance, the court
has erred in assuming as an universal major premis one to which there
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is, or at least has heretofore been, an universally recognized exception as
to the obligation of women.
But the court seems to insist that the main ground of its opinion is
not the personal unwillingness of the applicant to fight, but rather her
profession of a creed which is opposed to fighting. The second argument
it gives for denying the applicant citizenship runs something like this:
The good order and happiness of the United States require that one should
not counsel citizens not to defend their country by arms, in contravention
of one of the principles of the Constitution. Applicant would use her
"influence" to prevent citizens from defending their country by arms.
Therefore applicant is neither well disposed to the good order and happi-
ness of the United States nor attached to this principle of the Constitu-
tion, as required by the Act of Congress. The heart of this argument
seems to be that applicant is undesirable because opposed to the constitu-
tional principles of defense of country. To this Justice Holmes replies:
"Surely it cannot show lack of attachment to the principles of the Con-
stitution that she thinks it can be improved." It would seem that the
majoriy considered defense of country necessarily synonymous with defense
by arms, and that Holmes conceives that she believes in defense of country,
but in a mode different from the usual one. She conceives the duty as
one requiring her to work constantly for the abolition of the danger
against which the Constitution calls us to defend. Most of us think she
is stubborn not to fight when necessity calls for such: yet to her point of
view it is our own stubbornness which prevents the success of her plan
which would render fighting impossible, and defense complete. She will
not defend in our way; neither will we defend in hers. Such is the situa-
tion, as it seems to her.
As to the argument of the court that applicant would use her "influence"
to keep other citizens from fighting, it may be noted that those conscien-
tious objectors who are already citizens do this very thing (at least by
example). Hence the inquiry must be whether we are to show the same
tolerance for free thought with regard to admission into, as well as life
within this country. Holmes first says: "Some of her remarks might
excite popular prejudice, but if there is any principle of the Constitution
that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the
principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us,
but freedom for the thought that we hate." He then makes it clear that
to draw any such distinction in treatment is by implication to question
the constitutional devotion of a respected class of citizens. He says:
"Recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant's way, I would suggest
that the Quakers have done their share to make this country what it is,
that many citizens agree with the applicant's belief, and that I had not
supposed hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because
they believed more than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on
the Mount." J. V. H.
BnLLs AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS IN ANswER
TO FRAUD AND FAILURE or CoNsIDERATIoN-Action on a promissory note.
The defendant's answer admitted execution of the note and that the payee
endorsed and delivered it to the plaintiff before maturity and for value.
